4 3 1 2 160 161 Chapter Twelve | The Struggle Over Gush Ka�f Chapter Twelve The Struggle Over Gush Ka�f The establishment of the campaign's headquarters (aka the Mateh) - reasons and main course of ac�on. In an interview with 'Ha'aretz' newspaper on 2nd of Shevat, 5764 (02/02/2004), Ariel Sharon made a catastrophic announcement: He had decided to evacuate all Gush Ka�f se�lements down to the last one, as well as four other se�lements in northern Samaria. Since its incep�on, Gush Ka�f residents have been exposed to diverse threats to their future by poli�cians, intellectuals, and the media. So, when they heard Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's speech at the 2003 Herzliya conference, where he announced the Disengagement Plan, they were neither moved nor alarmed because they believed Sharon was a friend of the se�lements. Gush Ka�f leadership saw things differently and began to consider an appropriate response to the new situa�on. 'Veteran fighters' from the Golan Heights came over to join the struggle against the displacement of se�lements and guide them in their protest. "Comrades," said the Golan Heights veterans, "if you don't start that campaign, no one will start it for you. Only if you start, others will join you." 1 The message got through, and shortly a�er, an Ac�on Commi�ee was elected, which, in turn established a vibrant, driven by faith and determined 'campaign headquarters' (the Mateh) on its life's mission - to cancel Ariel Sharon's "Disengagement Plan." The headquarter worked day and night for about a year and a half un�l the last moment, mobilizing residents - youth and adults alike - in favor of the diverse ac�vi�es that were carried out. With the establishment of the headquarters, coopera�on with the Yesha Council (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) also began, which harnessed the residents of Judea and Samaria as well as na�onwide volunteers to the campaign. Everyone knew that this was not a personal struggle over a house, property or livelihood, but a struggle over values, educa�on, the army's voca�on and the State's conduct and future. Thus, in whatever shape the struggle took, advocacy reigned supreme and included a Jewish-value sen�ment in which the Creator of the world is always present.2 The campaign headquarters leaders —Rafi Seri, Kobi Bornstein, Lior Kalfa, Doron Ben Shlomi and Ayala Azran—immediately joined forces with three rabbis, Rabbi Kaminetzky, Rabbi Kadosh and Rabbi Netanel, to a�est to the Torah being an integral and essen�al part of the struggle in all its forms.3 The main course of ac�on was a ba�le over the private homestead, the Zionist-na�onalist-pioneer enterprise in the Gaza Strip and the na�onal motherland of the en�re people of Israel. However, it was not intended as war per se, but through love, speech, connec�ng and engaging ac�vi�es, warm and emo�onal convic�on and an emphasis on values in every ac�on.4 Faith was an integral part of the campaign, with the central mo�f being 'we shall do the best we can, and God shall do His, at His judgment.5 Simultaneously, many Gush Ka�f residents believed that God's decision on this ma�er would be influenced by their level of devo�on to the place. Therefore, they stayed un�l the 11th hour, took diverse ac�on courses, and did not prepare themselves and their families for the day a�er. Choosing Orange as the Campaign's Color Once the campaign's overall shape and the leading principles were established, it was also given a color: orange. Why? Because it is a striking, glowing, warm color, and it was also the color of the Gaza Coast Regional Council's flag. Orange shirts were already prepared for the first opera�on of the campaign headquarters, which took place in 23rd of Shevat, 5764 (02/15/2004). It was a four-day protest march that le� the Kissufim checkpoint toward Jerusalem to a�ract more supporters to the campaign, mainly from among the residents of the south. At the end of that march, a large rally was held in front of the Prime Minister's house in Jerusalem. The orange color proved helpful in a�rac�ng many people to join the march. Since, marke�ng-wise, s�cking to one color was the right thing to do - orange remained the campaign's color. At first, it was the symbol of Gush Ka�f, but then it expanded and became a nickname for ac�vi�es that support the Greater Israe - 'The Orange Ones.'6 Ge�ng Ready for the Campaign So, the campaign started by execu�ng diverse ac�vi�es that received broad media coverage, both because of their sheer size or uniqueness and because of the interest they provoked. Each ac�vity built a different layer in the Israeli public's connec�on to the se�lement in the Gaza Strip and the disengagement plan. The headquarters were divided into work teams - one team was responsible for strengthening and withholding faith, another team worked vis-a-vis the poli�cians and MK's, a communica�on team, an outreach team that established addi�onal na�onwide campaign headquarters and organized outreach Shabbat retreats, and a field performance and volunteer recruitment team. Gush Ka�f residents felt like Jacob's sons and learned from him how to prepare for crises: Gi�s (packages of Gush Ka�f vegetables were distributed at every ac�vity), Prayers, and War. It was a religious, poli�cal and spiritual campaign all at once.7 It was also clear to everyone that strengthening the residents of Gush Ka�f was necessary to guarantee the campaign's success because they were its 'star soldiers.' As �me passed and the disengagement date approached, it was necessary to add to and fill them with faith in the righteousness of their way. A�empts to Form a Parliamentary Majority Against the Disengagement Plan and their Results The first significant ac�vity in the poli�cal arena was the forma�on of a parliamentary majority against Sharon's plan. In Adar 5764 (March 2004) the leaders of the Yesha Council started a sit-down strike in front of the Prime Minister's office. They sat there for about two weeks in an a�empt to influence their friends from the Mafdal (Na�onal Religious Party) and the Na�onal Union to withdraw from the government. Concurrently, a billboard and informa�on campaign began throughout Israel. To receive public approval for a change in his posi�on, Sharon pledged in a speech to the Knesset dd on 3/15/2004 to pass the decision on to the Likud Party func�onaries. In a speech before the Likud conference, Sharon pledged that the referendum would bind all Likud representa�ves, himself included. "We are all public emissaries," said Nadir Tsur in his book "The Man Who Unravelled the Strip" (p. 170). A�er Sharon proposed to bring the Disengagement Plan to the approval of 200,000 Likud members, Yesha Council members and the campaign headquarters decided to reach out to the Likud members across Israel, to explain to them the importance of Gush Ka�f for the en�re country and convince them to vote against the Prime Minister's plan to eliminate Jewish se�lement in the Gaza Strip. Many people from Judea and Samaria and supporters of se�lement throughout the country joined this wide-range ac�vity. Together, they went door to door and met with all Likud members. The given explana�ons- poli�cal, religious, and Zionist - combined with complex scenarios of "what the day a�er will look like" - did the job. Likud voters rejected the Prime Minister's plan with a 60% majority.8 The joy of success was nipped in the bud because, on the advice of Minister Mrs. Livni, the Prime Minister brought a proposal with a different phrasing to the vote and generated an ar�ficial majority by dismissing two ministers. All the great effort invested in persuading Likud members - went down the drain. Sharon openly violated his public commitment to accept any decision of the Likud members and brought a new proposal to the government called "Revised Disengagement." It was exactly the same displacement decision that Likud members rejected by a huge majority, except for a different, staggered schedule. On 17 of Sivan, 5764, 06/06/2004, the government accepted the decision to disengage. Two days before the vote, it became clear to Sharon that he did not have a majority of ministers suppor�ng the plan. 11 ministers were in favor: 6 from the Likud, and 5 from the Shinui Pary. 12 ministers objected: 8 Likud ministers, 2 ministers of the Mafdal Party and 2 ministers of the Na�onal Union. Therefore, two days before the vote, on Friday, 15th of Sivan, 5764, 06/04/2004, Prime Minister Sharon fired ministers Avigdor Lieberman and Benny Alon, thereby crea�ng the necessary majority for himself. 1 Arik Sharon and his entourage visi�ng Lake Ka�f, on his le� is Zvi Hendel, Head of Council at the �me 2 A work mee�ng of Gush Ka�f leaders with members of the Yesha Council at the Kissufim checkpoint 3 Billboards all around Gush Ka�f and the en�re country 4 Demonstra�on of Gush Ka�f youth at Havat Shikmim
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